WikiDer > Spratli orollari bilan bog'liq tortishuv - Vikipediya

Spratly Islands dispute - Wikipedia

Spratli orollarida bir-birining ustiga chiqadigan hududiy da'volar

The Spratli orollari mojarosi davom etmoqda hududiy nizo o'rtasida Xitoy, Tayvan, Malayziya, Filippinlar, Vetnamva Bruney, egalik huquqiga tegishli Spratli orollari, orollar guruhi va ular bilan bog'liq bo'lgan "dengiz xususiyatlari" (riflar, banklar, caylar va boshqalar) Janubiy Xitoy dengizi. Nizo diplomatik tanglik va milliy hududiy da'volarni ilgari surishda harbiy bosim usullarini qo'llash (masalan, bahsli hududni harbiy bosib olish) bilan tavsiflanadi. Bruneydan boshqa hamma dengiz xususiyatlarini egallaydi.

Ushbu sohadagi "dengiz xususiyatlari" ning aksariyati kamida oltita ismga ega: "Xalqaro nom", odatda ingliz tilida; ba'zida PRC va ROC uchun farq qiladigan "xitoycha nom" (shuningdek, turli xil belgilar to'plamlarida); Vetnam, Filippin va Malayziya nomlari, shuningdek, muqobil ismlar mavjud (masalan, Spratli oroli ham bo'ron oroli deb nomlanadi), ba'zan esa evropadan kelib chiqqan ismlar (frantsuz, portugal, ispan, ingliz va boshqalar).[1]

Spratli orollari iqtisodiy va strategik sabablarga ko'ra muhimdir. Spratli maydoni potentsial jihatdan muhim, ammo katta darajada o'rganilmagan zaxiralariga ega moy va tabiiy gaz, bu dunyoda baliq ovlash uchun samarali maydon, bu tijorat tashish transportining eng gavjum joylaridan biri va atrofdagi mamlakatlar kengaytirilgan kontinental tokcha agar ularning da'volari tan olingan bo'lsa. Iqtisodiy rag'batlantirishdan tashqari, Spratlys Shimoliy-Sharqiy Osiyoga olib boradigan yirik dengiz savdo yo'llarini chetga surib, ularga Janubiy Xitoy dengizidagi dengiz faoliyatini kuzatib borish va potentsial ravishda harbiy kuchlarni joylashtirish va loyihalashtirish uchun muhim ahamiyatga ega. 2014 yilda Xitoy Spratlys ichidagi chuqurlash ishlari tufayli ushbu mintaqadagi harbiy mavjudligini yanada rivojlantirishni rejalashtirayotgani sababli xalqaro miqyosda e'tiborni kuchaytirdi.[2] 2015 yilda sun'iy yo'ldosh orqali olingan suratlarda Xitoy tez orada aerodrom qurayotgani aniqlandi Olovli xoch rifi Spratlys hududida melioratsiya ishlari boshqa joylarda davom etayotganda.[3][4][5] Faqatgina Xitoy (XXR), Tayvan (ROC) va Vetnam orollarning tarixiy suverenitetiga asoslanib da'vo qilishdi.[6] Ammo Filippinlar ushbu hududning bir qismini o'z hududi deb da'vo qilmoqda UNCLOS, kelishuv qismlari[7] Spratli orollari mojarosiga aloqador mamlakatlar tomonidan ratifikatsiya qilingan.

Mojaroning sabablari

Spratli orollariga, xususan, qo'shni xalqlarning va umuman olganda butun dunyoni qiziqtirishining bir qancha sabablari bor.

Uglevodorodlar

1968 yilda mintaqada neft topildi.[8] Xitoy Xalq Respublikasi Geologiya va mineral resurslar vazirligi (XXR) Spratli hududida 17,7 milliard tonna (1,60 × 10) neft va tabiiy gaz zaxiralari borligini taxmin qildi.10 kg),[iqtibos kerak] 13 milliard tonnaga nisbatan (1,17 × 10)10 kg) Quvaytga tegishli bo'lib, uni dunyodagi to'rtinchi yirik zaxira to'shagi sifatida joylashtirdi. The Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining Energiya ma'muriyati Spratli orollari yaqinidagi konlarda deyarli hech qanday neft yo'qligi va 100 milliard kub futdan kam tabiiy gaz borligi taxmin qilinmoqda.[9][10] Shunga qaramay, ushbu yirik potentsial zaxiralar qo'shni mamlakatlarning hududiy da'volarini kuchaytirishga yordam berdi.

1968 va 1970 yillarda Filippinlar o'zlarining hududiy da'volariga jiddiyroq qarashni boshladilar va avantyurist da'vo qilgan uchta orolga qo'shin joylashtirdilar. Tomas Kloma qismi sifatida Ozodlik.[11] 1973 yilda Vetnam qo'shinlari beshta orolda joylashtirilgan.[12]

1976 yil 11 martda Filippinning birinchi yirik neft kashfiyoti sohil bo'yida sodir bo'ldi Palavan, Spratli orollari hududiga yaqin. 2010 yilda ushbu neft konlari Filippinda iste'mol qilinadigan barcha neftning 15 foizini etkazib berdi.[13] 1992 yilda XXR va Vetnam AQShning neft qazib oluvchi kompaniyalariga Spratlysdagi bir-birining ustma-ust joylashgan maydonlarini qoplagan holda neft qidirish bo'yicha shartnomalar berishdi. 1992 yil may oyida,[14] The Xitoy milliy dengiz neft korporatsiyasi (CNOOC) va Crestone Energy (asoslangan AQSh kompaniyasi Denver, Kolorado) qo'shma razvedka ishlarini olib borish bo'yicha hamkorlik shartnomasini imzoladi Van'an bei-21 Blok, Janubiy Xitoy dengizining janubi-g'arbiy qismidagi Spratli orolining hududlarini o'z ichiga olgan 25155 kvadrat kilometr (9710 sqm) qismi.[15] Crestone shartnomasining bir qismi Vetnamning 133 va 134 bloklarini qamrab olgan bo'lib, u erda PetroVietnam, PetroStar Energy (AQSh) va ConocoPhillips Vietnam Exploration & Production, ConocoPhillips, istiqbollarni baholashga 1992 yil aprelda kelishib oldi. Bu Xitoy va Vetnam o'rtasida to'qnashuvga olib keldi, har biri boshqasidan shartnomasini bekor qilishni talab qildi.

Tijorat baliq ovi

Viloyat savdo baliq ovlash uchun dunyodagi eng samarali hududlardan biri hisoblanadi. 2010 yilda G'arbiy Markaziy Tinch okeani (Janubiy Xitoy dengizining XXR sohiliga eng shimoliy qismlarini hisobga olmaganda) dunyodagi baliq ovining 14 foizini tashkil etdi - 11,7 million tonna. Bu 1970 yilda 4 million tonnadan kam bo'lgan.[16] XXR Janubiy Xitoy dengizida umumiy qiymati bir trillion dollarga teng bo'lgan baliq ovlash va neft-gaz zaxiralari mavjud deb taxmin qildi.[iqtibos kerak] XXR va Filippinlar, XXR va Vetnam va boshqa xalqlar o'rtasida baliq ovlash kemalari uchun "begona" kemalar borasida ko'plab to'qnashuvlar bo'lgan. Eksklyuziv iqtisodiy zonalar (EEZ) va ommaviy axborot vositalari[qaysi?] xitoylik baliqchilar hibsga olingani to'g'risida muntazam ravishda xabar bering. 1984 yilda Bruney eksklyuziv baliq ovlash zonasini tashkil etdi Louisa rifi Spratli orollarining janubi-sharqida.[17]

Tijorat transporti

Mintaqa dunyodagi eng gavjum transport yo'llaridan biri hisoblanadi. 1980-yillarda Spratli orollari hududidan har kuni kamida 270 kema o'tgan. Dunyo bo'ylab supertankerlar transportining yarmidan ko'pi tonnaj bilan har yili mintaqaning suvlari orqali o'tadi. Tankerlarning Janubiy Xitoy dengizi orqali tashilishi, dengiz sathidan uch baravar ko'p Suvaysh kanali orqali besh baravar ko'p Panama kanali; Dunyo neftining 25% Janubiy Xitoy dengizi orqali o'tadi.[iqtibos kerak]

Qarama-qarshiliklar

Spratli orollarida bir qator e'tiborga loyiq to'qnashuvlar bo'lgan, ularning ba'zilari quyidagi maqolalarda muhokama qilinadi:

Xalqaro huquq

Janubiy Xitoy dengizining da'volari va kelishuvlari.

Kengaytirilgan kontinental tokcha da'volari, 2009 yil

Via orqali UNCLOS, Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkiloti qirg'oq chiziqlari bo'lgan mamlakatlarga BMTning Kontinental tok chegaralari bo'yicha komissiyasiga (CLCS) da'volar yuborishini ta'minladi,[18] (ular uchun kontinental tokcha 2009 yil 13 mayga qadar ularning qirg'oqlaridan 200 dengiz miliga uzaytirilishi kerak. Jami 48 ta davlat o'z da'volarini ilgari surdi va yana o'nlab odamlar dastlabki taqdimotlarini o'tkazdilar.[19] CLCS-ga yuborilgan ikkita taklif Janubiy Xitoy dengizidagi (SCS) da'volarni ko'rib chiqdi - Vetnam tomonidan SCSning shimoliy qismi (shu jumladan Parasel orollari) va yana bir narsa Vetnam va Malayziya tomonidan Spratli orollarining bir qismini o'z ichiga olgan ikki mamlakat o'rtasida SCS o'rtasida joylashgan "belgilangan maydon" bo'yicha qo'shma da'vo uchun. Bruney o'zining qirg'og'idan 200 dengiz uzoqligidagi qit'a tokchasiga da'vogarlik qilish niyati haqida oldindan xabar bergan.[20]

Xitoy (XXR) zudlik bilan ushbu ikkita taqdimotga qarshi norozilik namoyishlarini o'tkazdi va Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotini ularni ko'rib chiqmaslikka chaqirdi. Shuningdek, u mamlakatlarga o'zlarining suveren hududi deb aytgan orollarga da'vo qilmaslik to'g'risida qat'iy ogohlantirdi.[19][21]

Filippin ITLOS-ga norozilik namoyishi, 2011 yil

2011 yil 23 mayda Filippin Prezidenti Benigno Aquino III tashrif buyurgan Xitoy mudofaa vazirini ogohlantirdi Liang Guangli mumkin qurollanish poygasi mintaqada Janubiy Xitoy dengizidagi tortishuvlar tufayli ziddiyat kuchaygan bo'lsa. Mart oyida Filippinlar xitoylik patrul kemalari Spratlys yaqinidagi bahsli suvlarda Filippinning neft qidiruv kemasini bezovta qilganidan shikoyat qildilar va keyinchalik rasmiy norozilik bildirishdi. Dengiz huquqi bo'yicha xalqaro sud (ITLOS).[22]

Filippinlarning doimiy arbitraj sudiga taqdimnomasi, 2013–2016

2013 yil 22 yanvarda Filippinlar Xitoy Xalq Respublikasiga qarshi hakamlik ishlarini qo'zg'atdilar Doimiy Arbitraj sudi (PCA).[23][24] 2013 yil 19 fevralda Xitoy Filippinning xabarnomasini rad etdi va qaytarib berdi. Doimiy arbitraj sudi ushbu hakamlik sudida ro'yxatga olish organi vazifasini bajaradi.[24]

Filippin sudyasi Antonio T. Carpio ta'kidlashicha, bu ish faqat dengiz mojarosi bo'lib, hududiy xarakterga ega emas. Filippinlar tribunaldan Xitoyga tegishli ekanligiga oydinlik kiritishni so'raydi 9 chiziqli chiziq Xitoy imzolagan dengiz huquqi to'g'risidagi BMT Konvensiyasi (UNCLOS) bo'yicha kafolatlangan Filippinning eksklyuziv iqtisodiy zonasini inkor etishi mumkin. Ishning bir qismi sifatida Filippinlar toshlar suv sathidan zo'rg'a (1,8 metr) balandlikda (masalan,) Skarboro Shoal), 200 dengiz-mil (370 km; 230 mil) EEZ yoki faqat 12 dengiz-mil (22 km; 14 milya) hududiy dengizini yarating. Kabi past to'lqinli balandliklarga Xitoy mos kelishi mumkinligi to'g'risida aniqlik kiritish Yaramaslik rifi va Subi rifi ishda Filippinning EEZ doirasida ham kiritilgan. "Filippinlar tribunaldan Xitoy va Filippin o'rtasidagi EEZlarni bir-biriga mos keladigan dengiz o'lchovlari bilan chegaralashni so'ramayapti. Filippinlar suddan G'arbiy Filippin dengizida qanday orol ustidan suverenitet yoki suv sathidagi tosh ustida hukmronlik qilishini so'ramaydi. . "[25]

2016 yil 12 iyuldagi PCA press-reliziga binoan "[Tribunal sudi Filippin va Xitoy o'rtasida bo'lgani kabi, Konvensiyada ko'zda tutilgan huquqlardan tashqari, Xitoyning resurslarga tarixiy huquqlarini talab qilishi uchun hech qanday qonuniy asos yo'q edi, degan xulosaga keldi. dengiz sohalarida "to'qqiz chiziqli chiziq’".[26]

Diplomatik harakatlar

1992 yil Janubiy Xitoy dengizidagi ASEAN deklaratsiyasi

1992 yil 22 iyulda ASEAN Janubiy Xitoy dengizi to'g'risidagi deklaratsiyani e'lon qildi va nizoni zo'ravonlik ishlatmasdan tinch yo'l bilan hal qilish kerakligini ta'kidladi.[27]

1995 yilgi Shartnoma

1995 yilda XXR va Filippin o'rtasidagi nizolardan so'ng, an ASEAN- XXR va ASEANga a'zo davlatlar o'rtasida bir mamlakat ikkinchisini bahsli hududdagi har qanday harbiy harakatlar to'g'risida xabardor qilishi va bundan keyin hech qanday qurilish bo'lmasligi to'g'risida kelishuvga erishildi.[iqtibos kerak]

Shartnoma XXR va Malayziya tomonidan zudlik bilan buzilgan: bo'ron zarar ko'rgan, etti kishi PLA Navy kemalar hududga "baliq ovi boshpanalarini" ta'mirlash uchun kirgan Panganiban rifi (Yaramaslik rifi); Malayziya bino qurdi Tergovchi Shoal va Rizal rifiga (Commodore rifi) tushdi. Bunga javoban Filippin rasmiy norozilik namoyishlarini o'tkazdi, inshootlarni olib tashlashni, dengiz patrullarini kuchaytirishni talab qildi Kalayaan, va amerikalik siyosatchilarga XXR bazalarini samolyotda tekshirishga taklifnomalar berdi.[iqtibos kerak]

Janubiy Xitoy dengizida tomonlarning xulq-atvori to'g'risida deklaratsiya, 2002 y

2002 yil 4 noyabrda Pnomenda Janubiy Xitoy dengizida tomonlarning xulq-atvori to'g'risida deklaratsiya[28] 10 ta tashqi ishlar vazirlari tomonidan imzolangan ASEAN mamlakatlar va Xitoy (XXR). Tomonlar ushbu deklaratsiyada "to'g'ridan-to'g'ri manfaatdor suveren davlatlar tomonidan do'stona maslahatlashuvlar va muzokaralar orqali o'zlarining hududiy va yurisdiksiyaviy nizolarini tinch yo'l bilan, tahdid yoki kuch ishlatmasdan hal qilish" majburiyatini oladilar.[28] Tomonlar, shuningdek, tortishuvlarni murakkablashtiradigan yoki kuchaytiradigan, tinchlik va barqarorlikka ta'sir qiladigan, shu bilan birga hozirgi paytda yashamaydigan orollar, riflar, shoallar, qabrlar va boshqa xususiyatlarga ega yashashdan saqlanish bilan bog'liq faoliyat bilan o'zini tutishni o'z zimmalariga oldilar. Tomonlar ishonchni kuchaytirish choralarini ko'rishga va'da berishdi, masalan: o'zlarining mudofaa va harbiy amaldorlari o'rtasida dialoglar o'tkazish va fikr almashish; xavf-xatarga duchor bo'lgan yoki qiynalgan barcha odamlarga nisbatan odilona va insoniy munosabatni ta'minlash; yaqinlashib kelayotgan har qanday qo'shma / qo'shma harbiy mashqlar to'g'risida boshqa tomonlarga ixtiyoriy ravishda xabar berish; ixtiyoriy ravishda tegishli ma'lumotlarni almashish. Tomonlar, shuningdek, kooperativ faoliyatni o'rganishlari yoki amalga oshirishi mumkin: dengiz ilmiy tadqiqotlari; dengizda navigatsiya va aloqa xavfsizligi; qidiruv-qutqaruv ishlari; transmilliy jinoyatchilikka, shu jumladan noqonuniy giyohvand moddalar savdosi, qaroqchilik, dengizda qurolli talonchilik va qurol-yarog 'noqonuniy aylanishiga qarshi kurash.

Deklaratsiya taranglikni yumshatadi, ammo yuridik jihatdan majburiy bo'lgan odob-axloq qoidalariga to'g'ri kelmaydi.

Janubiy Xitoy dengizidagi odob-axloq qoidalari

2012 yil iyul oyida Xitoy (XXR) Janubiy Xitoy dengizida odob-axloq qoidalari bo'yicha munozaralarni boshlashga ochiqligini e'lon qildi, ammo barcha tomonlarni avvalgi deklaratsiyalar va Birlashgan Millatlar konvensiyalari ruhiga rioya qilgan holda o'zini tutishga chaqirdi. Ushbu e'lon ko'plab qo'shni davlatlar tomonidan tanqid qilindi, chunki o'sha paytda Xitoy o'rnatgan Skarboro Shoalida qarama-qarshiliklar mavjud edi. amalda boshqaruv.[29]

2012 yil 2 avgustda Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari Senati bir ovozdan qaror qabul qildi, Xitoyning 2012 yil iyul oyida Janubiy Xitoy dengizidagi bahsli hududlar ustidan nazoratni bir tomonlama ta'minlashga qaratilgan harakatlari "nizolarni hal qilish bo'yicha kelishilgan printsiplarga zid va tinch yo'l bilan hal qilishga xalaqit beradi".[30]

Xitoyni chuqurlashtirish ishlari

Subi rifi sun'iy orolda qurilgan, 2015 yil

2014 yilda Janes 2013-2014 yillarda Xitoy Spratlysdagi uchta uchastkada chuqurlashtirish va melioratsiya qilish bo'yicha muhim dasturni boshlaganligini xabar qildi. Jeyn shunday xulosaga keldi: "Xitoyni chuqurlashtirish va melioratsiya qilishning strategik ta'siri uni 1988 yildan beri Janubiy Xitoy dengizi mojarosidagi eng muhim o'zgarishlarga olib keladi. Jonson janubiy rifidagi to'qnashuv. Agar CGI loyihalarida ko'zda tutilganidek bajarilsa, Xitoy Spratli orollarida birinchi aeroportga ega bo'ladi va uning atrofidagi xususiyatlarni "suverenitet" sharhini beradigan baza bo'ladi.[2]

Jeyn, shuningdek, Spratliyadagi boshqa mamlakatlarning avvalgi qurilish prognozlaridan farqli o'laroq, 'Ushbu faoliyatning Xitoydan asosiy farqi shundaki, ular mavjud bo'lgan er massalarini o'zgartirgan, Pekin esa orollarni riflardan qurgan, aksariyat qismi yuqori oqimdagi suv '.

Loyihalarning ma'lum rasmiy muddati yo'q; ibora "katta qum devori"tomonidan birinchi marta ishlatilgan Garri Xarris, komandiri AQSh Tinch okean floti, 2015 yil mart oyida.[31]

2015 yil Fiery Cross Reef-da aerodrom qurilishi

2015 yil aprel oyida sun'iy yo'ldosh orqali olingan yangi suratlar Xitoy aerodromni tezkorlik bilan qurayotganligini ko'rsatdi Olovli xoch rifi, Spratlysdagi doimiy ravishda chuqurlash ishlari bilan bir qatorda.[4] Sentyabr oyida Xitoy 3125 metrlik uchish-qo'nish yo'lagini qurib bitkazdi.[32]

Da'volar va ularning asoslari

Spratli orollarini egallagan turli mamlakatlar xaritasi
Shimoliy Borneo shahridagi dengizning yirik qora va oq xaritasi, 1881 yilda chiqarilgan va 1935 yilga tuzatilgan.

Bruney

Bruney bu qismga da'vo qilmoqda Janubiy Xitoy dengizlari uning bir qismi sifatida unga eng yaqin kontinental tokcha va Eksklyuziv iqtisodiy zona (EEZ). 1984 yilda Bruney yuqoridagi suv orollarini o'z ichiga olgan EEZ e'lon qildi Louisa rifi.[17][33] Bruney ushbu hududda harbiy nazoratni amalga oshirmaydi.

Bruney da'vosining asoslari

Bruneyning rifga bo'lgan da'volari Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Dengiz huquqi to'g'risidagi konvensiyasi (UNCLOS).[34][35] Bruney Spratli orollari zanjirining janubiy qismi aslida uning kontinental shelfining bir qismi, shuning uchun uning hududi va resurslarining bir qismi ekanligini ta'kidlaydi.[36]

Malayziya

Malayziya Spratli orollaridagi oz sonli orollarni da'vo qiladi va uning da'volari faqat unga kiritilgan orollarni qamrab oladi Eksklyuziv iqtisodiy zona tomonidan belgilangan 200 milya Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Dengiz huquqi to'g'risidagi konvensiyasi. Malayziya o'zining kontinental shelfida deb hisoblagan uchta orolni harbiy jihatdan egallab oldi. Rifni yutib oling (Layang Layang / Terumbu Layang / Pulau Layang Layang) 1983 yilda nazorat ostida bo'lgan va a orqali orolga aylangan melioratsiya hozirda sho'ng'in kurorti ham mavjud.[37] Malayziya harbiylari ham egallaydi Ardasier rifi (Terumbu Ubi) va Mariveles rifi (Terumbu Mantanani).[33]

Malayziya da'vosining asoslari

Malayziyaning da'volari kontinental shelf printsipiga asoslanadi va uning chegaralarida aniq belgilangan koordinatalarga ega EEZ 1979 yilda belgilangan.[37][38] Ushbu dalil orollarning borligini talab qiladi res nullius va ushbu talab Yaponiya orollar ustidan o'z suverenitetidan voz kechganda bo'lgani kabi qondirilishi aytilmoqda San-Fransisko shartnomasi, hech qanday maxsus benefitsiarisiz orollarga bo'lgan huquqdan voz kechish yuz berdi. Shuning uchun orollar bo'ldi res nullius va ilova qilish uchun mavjud.[33][39]

Xitoy Respublikasi (Tayvan) va Xitoy Xalq Respublikasi (Xitoy)

Janubiy Xitoy dengiz orollari xaritasi, Ichki ishlar vazirligi tomonidan, ROC, 1947 y.

Xitoy Xalq Respublikasi (XXR) butun Spratli orollarini tarixga emas, balki Xitoyga asoslangan deb da'vo qilmoqda UNCLOS.[40] XXR UNCLOSning ishtirokchisi bo'lib, 1994 yil 29 iyulda shartnomani imzoladi.

Hukmronlik qilgan Xitoy Respublikasi (ROC) materik Xitoy 1949 yilgacha va 1949 yildan beri Tayvan bilan chegaradosh bo'lib, Spratli orollarining hammasiga da'vo qilmoqda.

XXR va ROC da'volari uchun asos

Miloddan avvalgi 200 yildan beri xitoylik baliqchilar orollar atrofida baliq tutishgan.[41] Xitoy orollarni kashf etganini da'vo qilmoqda Xan sulolasi 2 ichida Miloddan avvalgi. Orollar davrida tuzilgan xaritalarda belgilangan deb da'vo qilingan Sharqiy Xan sulolasi va Sharqiy Vu (lardan biri Uch qirollik). Beri Yuan sulolasi 12-asrda Spratlys bo'lishi mumkin bo'lgan bir necha orollar Xitoy hududi sifatida belgilangan Yuanshi, tomonidan buyurtma qilingan rasmiy tarix Xongvu imperatori ning Min sulolasi 1369 yilda, uning sifatsizligi va ko'plab xatolar uchun tanqidga uchragan.[42][43] Ushbu yorliq shuningdek Tsing sulolasi 13-asrdan 19-asrgacha;[44] orollar boshqalar qatorida 1755 yil xaritasida paydo bo'lgan bo'lishi mumkin.[44][45] Arxeologik tadqiqotlar natijasida qoldiqlari topildi Xitoy Orollardagi sopol idishlar va tangalar, XXR da'vosining isboti sifatida keltirilgan, ammo ular xitoyliklarning halokatga uchragan kemalaridan kelib chiqqan bo'lishi mumkin. junks.[46]

19-asrda evropaliklar Xaynandagi xitoylik baliqchilar har yili bir yil davomida Spratli orollarida istiqomat qilishganini aniqladilar, 1877 yilda esa Spratliylarga birinchi zamonaviy huquqiy da'volarni boshlagan inglizlar edi.[47][48]

1883 yilda Germaniya Spratlys va Paracels-ni o'rganishda Xitoy ularga qarshi norozilik namoyishlarini o'tkazdi. Xitoy 1902 va 1907 yillarda dengiz kuchlarini tekshiruv safarlariga yuborgan va orollarga bayroqlar va markerlar qo'ygan. Tsin sulolasining vorisi bo'lgan Xitoy Respublikasi, Xaynan yurisdiktsiyasidagi Spratli va Paratsel orollarini da'vo qildi.[49]

Spratli va Paratsellar Frantsiyadan tortib olindi[50] 1939 yilda Yaponiya tomonidan. Yaponiya Spratlysni Tayvan yurisdiksiyasi orqali va Paracellarni Xaynan yurisdiksiyasi orqali boshqargan.[47] Paratsellar va Spratlys 1945 yilda Yaponiya taslim bo'lganidan keyin Yaponiyadan Xitoy Respublikasiga topshirildi,[51] chunki ittifoqchi kuchlar Xitoyga ushbu sohada yapon taslim bo'lishlarini topshirdilar.[49]

Ikkinchi jahon urushi tugagandan so'ng, Xitoy Respublikasi "eng faol da'vogar" bo'ldi. 1946 yilda Xitoy Respublikasi Itu Aba (Taypin) orolini garnizonga oldi va unga Xitoy bayroqlari va markerlarini osib qo'ydi Paratseldagi Vudi oroli, Frantsiya urinib ko'rdi, ammo ularni Vudi orolidan tark eta olmadi.[47] Xitoy Respublikasining maqsadi frantsuzlarning da'volarini blokirovka qilish edi.[49][52] Xitoy Respublikasi 1947 yilda butun Janubiy Xitoy dengizidagi U shaklidagi da'voni ko'rsatib, Xitoy hududidagi Spratli va Paratsellarni ko'rsatgan xaritani tuzdi.[49]

1946-1950 va 1956 yillardagi Tayvan garnizoni - Itu-Aba hozirgi kungacha Spratli orollarining "samarali ishg'oli" ni anglatadi.[53][54]

Tayvan garnizoni kuchlari 1971 yilgacha Filippinning Spratliga qarshi harakatlarini faol ravishda to'xtatib turishdi. BMTning XXRni tan olish to'g'risidagi ovoz berishidan so'ng Tayvanda ROC hukumati endi o'z huquqlarini himoya qilishga qodir emas edi. Filippinlar va Vetnam ushbu imkoniyatdan foydalanib, Spratlysda forpostlar tashkil qildilar.

Yapon olimi Taoka Shunji jurnal maqolasida Xitoyning Janubiy Xitoy dengizi va Spratli orollarida oldinga siljishi haqida gap ketganda, ko'plab yaponlar orasida Filippin hududi bosib olinmoqda degan taxmin noto'g'ri bo'lganligini aytdi. Unga ko'ra, "Ispaniya Filippinlarni AQShga bergan 1898 yilgi Parij shartnomasida, tanazzul ob'ekti uzunlikning 118 darajasidan sharqda (janubda 116) bo'lgan; va Spratli orollari o'sha chiziqning tashqarisida (g'arbiy qismida) tushadi. Shuning uchun AQSh 1938 yilda Yaponiya ularni "Shinnan Gunto" nomi bilan Tayvan bilan bog'langan deb qo'shib qo'yganida, bu orollarni AQSh hududi deb da'vo qilmadi. orollar "aniqlanmagan." "[55]

Filippinlar

1801 xaritasi Sharqiy Hindiston Spratli orollarining joylashishini ko'rsatadigan orollar. O'shandan beri nomlarning aksariyati o'zgargan.

Filippinlarning da'volari Spratlys masalalari bo'yicha suverenitetga asoslangan Res nullius va geografiya. Filippinlar ularning da'vosini rad qilishdi Res nullius chunki 1930 yillarga qadar Frantsiya va undan keyin Yaponiya orollarni egallab olguniga qadar orollar ustidan samarali suverenitet yo'q edi. Yaponiya orollar bo'yicha o'z suverenitetidan voz kechganida San-Fransisko shartnomasi, hech qanday maxsus benefitsiarisiz orollarga bo'lgan huquqdan voz kechish yuz berdi. Shuning uchun orollar bo'ldi Res nullius da'voga binoan va ilova qilish uchun mavjud.

1956 yilda Filippinning xususiy fuqarosi, Tomas Kloma, bir tomonlama ravishda Janubiy Xitoy dengizidagi 53 ta xususiyatga ega davlat deb e'lon qildi va uni "Ozodlik" deb atadi. Xitoy Respublikasi bosib olishga o'tdi asosiy orol javoban.[iqtibos kerak] 1974 yil dekabrda Klomani hibsga olishdi va Filippinlarga bir peso uchun har qanday huquqqa ega bo'lish huquqini etkazish uchun hujjatni imzolashga majbur qilishdi.[56] Cloma o'z da'vosini qo'shib olgan Filippin hukumatiga sotdi (de-yure) orollarni 1978 yilda chaqirib, ularni chaqirdi Kalayaan.[iqtibos kerak]1978 yil 11-iyunda Prezident Ferdinand Markos Filippin Prezidentining 1596-sonli farmonini chiqarib, Spratli orollarini (u erda Kalayaan orollari guruhi deb yuritiladi) Filippin hududi deb e'lon qildi.[57]

Ichki suvlar, dengiz, xalqaro shartnomalar chegaralari va eksklyuziv iqtisodiy zonani aks ettiruvchi Filippin da'vo qilgan hududiy xarita.

Filippinning Kalayaanga geografik asosda da'vosini Kalayaan guruhi tarkibidagi eng katta orol kattaligi sababli Janubiy Xitoy dengizidagi boshqa orol guruhlaridan farq qiladi degan da'vo yordamida umumlashtirish mumkin.[iqtibos kerak] Filippinlarning Spratliga nisbatan geografik da'vosi to'g'risida foydalangan ikkinchi dalil shundan iboratki, Filippin da'vo qilgan barcha orollar uning 200- qismida joylashgan.milya Eksklyuziv iqtisodiy zona 1982 yilga ko'ra Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Dengiz huquqi to'g'risidagi konvensiyasi. Ushbu dalil orollarning mavjudligini taxmin qiladi res nullius.[58] Filippinlar ham kurash olib borishmoqda dengiz qonunchiligi Xitoy Xalq Respublikasi Spratlysga o'zining dastlabki da'volarini kengaytira olmaydi, chunki XXR arxipelagik davlat emas.

Vetnam

Hududiy yodgorligi Vetnam Respublikasi (Janubiy Vetnam) kuni Janubi-g'arbiy Cay, Spratli orollari, vayronani Vetnam hududining bir qismi sifatida belgilaydigan (to Phướ Tuy viloyati). 1956 yil 22 avgustdan 1975 yilgacha, Vetnam Sotsialistik Respublikasidan boshqasi bilan almashtirilgunga qadar (keyingi merosxo'r davlat) Saygonning qulashi)

1994 yil 25 iyulda Vetnam UNCLOS. Tasdiqlangandan so'ng u quyidagilarni e'lon qildi:

The Milliy assambleya Vyetnamning Hoang Sa va Truong Sa arxipelagi ustidan suvereniteti va Sharqiy dengizdagi hududiy da'volarga oid nizolarni hamda boshqa nizolarni tinchlik muzokaralari orqali tenglik, o'zaro hurmat va tushunish ruhida va munosib hurmat bilan hal qilish bo'yicha pozitsiyasini takrorlaydi. xalqaro huquq, xususan 1982 y Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Dengiz huquqi to'g'risidagi konvensiyasiva qirg'oq davlatlarining o'zlarining kontinental tokchalari va eksklyuziv iqtisodiy zonalari ustidan suveren huquqlari va yurisdiksiyasi.[59]

Xitoyning da'vosiga Vetnamning javobi shundaki, Tsianli Changsha va Vanli Shitang haqidagi xitoy yozuvlari xitoylik bo'lmagan hududlar haqidagi yozuvlardir.[60] Masalan, Qianli Changsha va Vanli Shitang qadimgi xitoy tilidagi matnlarda Ling Vay Day Da da tilga olingan.[61] va Zhu Fan Zhi[62] Jiaozhi dengizida bo'lganidek, Jiaozhi zamonaviy shimoliy Vetnamdagi Xitoy provinsiyasining eski nomi yoki chet ellarga yozilgan yozuv sifatida.

Vetnamning fikri shundan iboratki, xitoy yozuvlari suverenitetni e'lon qilish va amalga oshirishni tashkil etmaydi va Xitoy Ikkinchi Jahon urushidan keyin Spratlys ustidan suverenitet e'lon qilmagan.

Boshqa tomondan, Vetnam Spratlysga suverenitetni e'lon qilish va amalga oshirish to'g'risidagi xalqaro qonunga asoslanib da'vo qilmoqda.

Vetnam Xalq dengiz kuchlari Dengiz piyoda askarlari yurish qilmoqda Spratli oroli

Vetnam Spratli va Paratsel orollarini hech bo'lmaganda 17-asrdan boshlab, ular hech qanday davlat suvereniteti ostida bo'lmagan paytdan beri egallab olganliklarini va ikki arxipelag ustidan suverenitetni doimiy ravishda va tinch yo'l bilan Xitoy qurolli kuchlari bosib olguncha amalga oshirganliklarini da'vo qilmoqda. .[63] Yilda Phủ biên tạp lục (撫 邊 雜 錄 錄, Chegara hududidagi patsifikatsiyaning turli xil yozuvlari) olim tomonidan Lê Quý Dong, Hoàng Sa (Parasel orollari) va Trường Sa (Spratli orollari) Quảng Ngai okrugiga tegishli ekanligi aniqlandi. Yilda Đại Nam nấất thàng đồ (大 南 ー 統 統 全 圖), 1838 yilda qurilgan Vetnam atlasi, Trường Sa Vetnam hududi sifatida ko'rsatilgan.[64] Vetnam orollarda ko'plab geografik va resurs tadqiqotlarini o'tkazgan.[64] Ushbu so'rovnomalar natijalari Vetnam adabiyotida va XVII asrdan beri nashr etilgan tarixda qayd etilgan. Bilan imzolangan shartnomadan so'ng Nguyen sulolasi, Frantsiya Vetnamni xalqaro ishlarda vakili bo'lgan va orollar ustidan suverenitetni amalga oshirgan.[64]

The Qohira deklaratsiyasiIkkinchi Jahon urushi oxiriga kelib ittifoqchilar va Xitoy tomonidan tuzilgan bo'lib, ittifoqchilar Yaponiyadan ajratib, Xitoyga qaytmoqchi bo'lgan hududlarni sanab o'tdilar. Deklaratsiya mualliflari orasida Xitoy bo'lishiga qaramay, ushbu ro'yxatda Spratlys yo'q edi.[65] Vyetnamning Xitoyning Qohira deklaratsiyasida Spratliga nisbatan suverenitetini qandaydir tarzda tan olganligi haqidagi da'vosiga javobi shundaki, uning asoslari yo'q.

Yaponiya bilan tinchlik shartnomasi bo'yicha San-Frantsisko konferentsiyasida Sovet Ittifoqi Paratsellar va Spratlilarni Xitoyga tegishli deb tan olishni taklif qildi. Ushbu taklif delegatlarning aksariyati tomonidan rad etildi. 1951 yil 7-iyulda Tran Van Xyu boshlig'i Bảo Đại Hukumat (Vetnam shtati) konferentsiyadagi delegatsiya Paratsellar va Spratlilar Vetnam hududining bir qismi ekanligini e'lon qildi. Ushbu deklaratsiya konferentsiyadagi 51 vakil tomonidan hech qanday qiyinchiliklarga duch kelmadi.[64]

Matni San-Frantsisko shartnomasi Xitoyga qaytariladigan Spratlys yoki boshqa orol hududlarini ro'yxatiga kiritmagan.[66]

The Jeneva kelishuvlariXitoy tomonidan imzolangan Birinchi Hindiston urushi tugadi. Frantsuz Hind-Xitoy uch mamlakatga bo'lingan: Laos, Kambodja va Vetnam. Vetnam 17-Parallel bo'ylab vaqtincha bo'linishi kerak edi.

I bob, 4-moddada:

Ikki yakuniy qayta guruhlash zonalari orasidagi vaqtinchalik harbiy demarkatsiya chizig'i hududiy suvlarga qirg'oqning umumiy chizig'iga perpendikulyar chiziq bilan uzaytiriladi. Ushbu chegaradan shimolda joylashgan barcha qirg'oq orollari qurolli kuchlar tomonidan evakuatsiya qilinadi Frantsiya ittifoqiva uning janubidagi barcha orollar kuchlari tomonidan evakuatsiya qilinadi Vetnam-Xalq armiyasi.[67]

1955 yil 26 oktyabrda Vetnam Respublikasi "Janubiy Vetnam" o'rniga Vetnam shtati (qismi Frantsiya ittifoqi) va uning huquqlarini meros qilib olish. Vetnam hukumati gazetani boshqaradigan Vetnamning Birlashgan Yoshlar Ligasi Thanh Nên Yangiliklar, da'volarga ko'ra, o'sha davrda kichik qiziqish uyg'otadigan offshor arxipelaglar to'g'risida aniq bir narsa aytilmagan bo'lsa ham, Vetnam respublikasi barcha merosxo'rlarga meros bo'lib qolgan barcha tomonlar buni aniq angladilar. Frantsuz Hind-Xitoy17-Parallel ostida joylashgan Vetnam hududlari. Paracel va Spratly arxipelaglari (ular 17-paralleldan pastda joylashgan) 1933 yildan beri Frantsuz Hind-Xitoy tarkibiga kirganligi sababli, ular "Janubiy Vetnam" hududining bir qismi bo'lgan. Frantsuzlar o'zlarining unvonlari, huquqlari va da'volarini Vetnam Respublikasiga ikki orol zanjiri bo'yicha berganlar.[68][ishonchli manba?]

Vetnam Respublikasi (RVN) orollar ustidan suverenitetni amalga oshirdi, Spratlysga chegara belgilarini qo'yish orqali Janubiy Vetnam arxipelagi ustidan suverenitetni ko'rsatdi. Oxirigacha Vetnam urushi The Vetnam Respublikasi dengiz floti 1975 yilgacha, Shimoliy Vetnam qo'shinlari Janubiy Vetnam qo'shinlariga hujum qilib, orollarni egallab olguniga qadar Spratli orollarining aksariyati ustidan harbiy nazoratni olib borgan. Keyin Vetnam urushi, birlashgan Vetnam SRV (Vetnam Sotsialistik Respublikasi) Spratli orollarini Vetnamning ajralmas qismi sifatida da'vo qilishni davom ettirdi.

Bosh vazir tomonidan yuborilgan xat Phạm Văn Đồng Shimoliy Vetnamdan Xitoy premeriga Chjou Enlai 1958 yilda Xitoyning hududiy suvlarining 12 dengiz milining kengligi to'g'risida.

Xitoy Shimoliy Vetnamning sobiq bosh vaziri tomonidan yozilgan xatni tayyorladi Phạm Văn Đồng 1958 yilda Paratsel va Spratli orollari ustidan suverenitetga ega ekanligining isboti sifatida. Vetnam gazetasi Thanh Niên yangiliklari da'volarga ko'ra, Xitoy har qanday orol zanjiriga bevosita ishora qilmaydigan xatni qasddan noto'g'ri ko'rsatgan. Bundan tashqari, u xat yozilgan ruh va vaqtni e'tiborsiz qoldiradi. O'sha vaqt ichida ikki kommunistik qo'shnilar juda yaqin aloqalarda bo'lishgan va AQSh dengiz kuchlari patrullik qilishgan Tayvan bo‘g‘ozi, ikkalasini ham tahdid qildi. Maktubda mavjud bo'lgan hududiy nizoga hech qanday huquqiy aloqasi bo'lmagan diplomatik xayrixohlik ishorasi aks etgan:[68][ishonchli manba?]

AslIngliz tili

Thưa Đồng chí Tổng lý,

Chúng tôi xin trân trọng báo tin để Đồng chí Tổng lý rõ:

Chính phủ nước Việt Nam Dân chủ Cộng hòa ghi nhận và tánh bản tuyên bố, ngày 4 tháng 1958 in 1958, của Chính phủ nước Cộng hoà Nhân dân Trung Hoa, quyết ịị ốị Trịị

Chính phủ nước Việt Nam Dân chủ Cộng hòa tôn trọng quyết định ấy và sẽ chỉ thị cho các cơ quan Nhà nóc có trách nhiệm triệt để tôn trọng hải phận cả nongng cốn nủng cânng cân n hon củn n hon cướn nủn củn nủn củn nủn cnn nhc nnc nnc nnc cnn nhc ngc Hoa trên mặt biển.

Chúng tôi xin kính gửi Đồng chí Tổng lý lời chào rất trân trọng.

Hurmatli Bosh vazir o'rtoq,

Vetnam Demokratik Respublikasi hukumati Xitoy Xalq Respublikasi hukumati tomonidan Xitoyning hududiy dengizining kengligi to'g'risidagi qaror to'g'risida 1958 yil 4 sentyabrda e'lon qilingan deklaratsiyani tan olishini va qo'llab-quvvatlashini tantanali ravishda ma'lum qilamiz.

Vetnam Demokratik Respublikasi Hukumati ushbu qarorni hurmat qiladi va o'z davlat idoralarini Xitoy Xalq Respublikasi bilan dengizdagi barcha munosabatlarda Xitoyning hududiy dengizining 12 dengiz dengizining kengligini mutlaqo hurmat qilishga yo'naltiradi.

Hurmat bilan,

1958 yil 4 sentyabrda AQSh dengiz flotining ettinchi floti Tayvanni to'g'ri qo'riqlashi bilan Xitoy o'z hududiy suvlarining kengligini 12 dengiz miliga etkazish to'g'risida qaror qabul qilganini e'lon qildi. Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkiloti (unga Xitoy hali ham a'zo bo'lmagan) 1956 yilda Shveytsariyada dengiz huquqi bo'yicha birinchi konferentsiyani o'tkazdi va natijada tuzilgan shartnomalar, shu jumladan Hududiy dengiz va qo'shni zona to'g'risidagi konventsiya1958 yilda imzolangan. Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining konferentsiyasi muvaffaqiyatli deb hisoblangan bo'lsa-da, u har bir davlatning hududiy suvlarining aniq kengligini bir oz hal qilmadi; Masalan, AQSh uch dengiz milini cho'zishi kerakligini aytdi.[68][ishonchli manba?]

1958 yil 14 sentyabrda Shimoliy Vetnam Bosh vaziri Phạm Văn Đồng Bosh vazirga o'z xatini yozgan Chjou Enlai Xitoyning deklaratsiyasiga javoban. Vetnam gazetasi Thanh Nien News quyidagi uchta sababga ko'ra Xitoyning Paracel va Spratly arxipelaglariga bo'lgan suverenitet da'volarida ushbu xatning hech qanday huquqiy ahamiyati yo'qligini ta'kidlaydi.

  • 1-nuqta: Vetnam Demokratik Respublikasi (Shimoliy Vetnam) Parongel va Spratli arxipelaglarini Bosh vazir Dong o'z maktubini yozgan paytda nazorat qilmagan.
  • 2-nuqta: 1946 va 1957 yillar konstitutsiyalari ning Vetnam Demokratik Respublikasi hududiy transferlar mamlakatning eng qudratli organi bo'lgan parlament akti bilan hal qilinishi kerakligini belgilab qo'ydi. Shunday qilib, Bosh vazir orollardan voz kechishga haqli emas edi.
  • 3-band: Bosh vazir Fam Van Dongning maktubi faqatgina Xitoyning 12 ta dengiz milidagi hududiy suvlar to'g'risidagi deklaratsiyasiga javob sifatida yozilgan bir tomonlama deklaratsiyadir. Maktubda hech qanday arxipelag ustidan hududiy suverenitet haqida hech narsa aytilmagan.[68][ishonchli manba?]

Vetnam tomonidan ishg'ol qilingan orollar okrug sifatida tashkil etilgan Xan Xa viloyati. 2009 yilgi aholini ro'yxatga olish ma'lumotlariga ko'ra Trường Sa tumani 195 kishi istiqomat qiladi.[69] 12-da Milliy assambleya (2007–2011) Trang-Sa shahrida erta saylovlar bo'lib o'tdi, xalq va askarlar birinchi marta mahalliy okrug hukumatiga ovoz berishdi. Trường Sa birinchi marta oddiy ichki okrug kabi tashkil etilgan, a shaharcha (Trường Sa) va ikkitasi kommunalar (Sinh Tồn and Song Tử Tây). Forty nine people were elected to the communes' people's councils.[iqtibos kerak] In July 2012 the Milliy assambleya of Vietnam passed a law demarcating Vietnamese sea borders to include the Spratly and Paracel Islands.[70][71]

Champa historically had a large presence in the South China Sea. The Vietnamese broke Champa's power in an invasion of Champa in 1471, and then finally conquered the last remnants of the Cham odamlar a war in 1832.[72] The Vietnamese government fears that using the evidence of Champa's historical connection to the disputed islands in the South China Sea would expose the human rights violations and killings of ethnic minorities in Vietnam such as in the 2001 va 2004 uprisings, and lead to the issue of Cham autonomy being brought to attention.[73]

Tabular listing of features showing country possessions

Xronologiya

19-asrEuropeans found that Chinese fishermen from Hainan annually sojourned on the Spratly islands for part of the year.[47][48]
1870British naval captain James George Meads established the micronation The Morac-Songhrati-Meads respublikasi.
1883When the Spratlys and Paracels were being surveyed by Germany in 1883, China issued protests.[41]
1887The 1887 Chinese-Vietnamese Boundary convention signed between France and China after the Xitoy-Frantsiya urushi of 1884-1885 recognised China as the owner of the Spratly and Paracel islands.[41]
1900Colonial French Indochina asserted that the state Bac Hai Company had exercised Vietnamese sovereignty in the Spratlys since the 18th century.[74]
1927The French ship SS De Lanessan conducted a scientific survey of the Spratly Islands.
1930France launched a second expedition with the La Malicieuse, which raised the French flag on an island called Île de la Tempête. Chinese fishermen were present on the island; the French made no attempt to expel them.
1933Three French ships took control of nine of the largest islands and declared French sovereignty over the archipelago to the great powers including the UK, US, China and Japan, according to the principles found in the Berlin convention. France administered the area as part of Cochinchina.

Japanese companies applied to the French authority in Cochichina for phosphate-mining licenses in the Spratlys.

1939The Yaponiya imperiyasi disputed French sovereignty over the islands, claiming that Japan was the first country to discover the islands. Japan declared its intention to place the island group under its jurisdiction. France and the United Kingdom protested and reasserted French sovereignty claims.
1941Japan forcibly occupied the island group and remained in control until the end of World War II, administering the area as part of Taiwan.

Japan established a submarine base on Itu Aba Island.

1945After Japan's surrender at the end of World War II, the Republic of China claimed the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The Republic of China sent troops to Itu Aba Island; forces erected sovereignty markers and named it Taiping Island.
1946France dispatched warships to the islands several times, but no attempts were made to evict Chinese forces.
1947China produced a map with 9 undefined dotted lines, and claimed all of the islands within those lines.[75] France demanded the Chinese withdraw from the islands.
1948France ceased maritime patrols near the islands and China withdrew most of its troops.
1951At the 1951 San-Frantsisko konferentsiyasi ustida Yaponiya bilan tinchlik shartnomasi, the Soviet Union proposed that the Spratlys belonged to China. The delegates overwhelmingly rejected this suggestion. The delegates from Vietnam, which at that time was a French protectorate, declared sovereignty over the Paracel and the Spratly Islands, which was not opposed by any delegate at the conference. China did not attend the conference and was not a signatory of the treaty.
1956On 15 June 1956, Vice-Foreign Minister Un Van Khiem of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam received Li Zhimin, Chargé d'Affaires reklama vaqtinchalik of the Chinese Embassy in Vietnam, and told him that, "according to Vietnamese data, the Xisha and Nansha Islands are historically part of Chinese territory". Le Loc, Acting Director of the Asian Department of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry was present and specifically cited Vietnamese data and pointed out that "judging from history, these islands were already part of China at the time of the Song dynasty".[76]
1956Tomas Cloma, director of the Maritime Institute of the Philippines, claimed sovereignty over the northwestern two-thirds of the Spratly Islands, naming his territory Kalaya'an ("Freedomland"). The People's Republic of China, the Republic of China, France, South Vietnam, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands all issued protests. The Republic of China and South Vietnam sent naval units to the islands, though South Vietnam left no permanent garrison. Later in the year, South Vietnam declared its annexation of the Spratly Islands as part of its Phướ Tuy viloyati.
1958The People's Republic of China issued a declaration defining its territorial waters which encompassed the Spratly Islands. Shimoliy Vetnam bosh vaziri, Phạm Văn Đồng, sent a formal note to Chjou Enlai, stating that the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam respected the decision on the 12 nautical mile limit of territorial waters. Both the South Vietnamese government and the communist revolutionary movement in South Vietnam continued to assert that the Spratlys belonged to Vietnam.
1961–63Janubiy Vetnam established sovereignty markers on several islands in the chain.
1968The Philippines sent troops to three islands on the premise of protecting Kalayaan citizens, and announced the annexation of the Kalayaan island group.
1971Malaysia issued claims to some of the Spratly Islands.
1972The Philippines incorporated the Kalayaan islands into its Palavan viloyat.
1975The re-unified Vietnam declared claims over the Spratly Islands.
1978A presidential decree from the Philippines outlined territorial claims to the Kalayaan portion of the islands.
1979Malaysia published a map of its continental-shelf claim, which included twelve islands from the Spratly group.

Vietnam published a oq qog'oz outlining its claims to the islands and disputing those of the other claimants.

1982Vietnam published another white paper, occupied several of the islands and constructed military installations.

The Philippines occupied several more islands and constructed an airstrip.[qayerda?]

1983Malaysia occupied Swallow Reef (Layang Layang), in the south of the Spratly Islands. A naval base and diving resort was later built at this location on reclaimed land.
1984Brunei established an exclusive fishing-zone encompassing the Louisa rifi and neighbouring areas in the southeastern Spratly Islands.
1986The first Philippine-Vietnam Joint Marine Scientific Research Expedition in the South China Sea was conducted aboard the RPS Explorer.
1987The People's Republic of China (PRC) conducted naval patrols in the Spratly Islands and established a permanent base.[qayerda?]
1988PRC warships and Vietnamese transport ships clashed at the South Johnson Reef. Over 70 Vietnamese were killed and two Vietnamese transport ships were sunk. The PRC gained control of some of the Spratly reefs.
1994The People's Republic of China, Malaysia, and the Philippines sign the Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Dengiz huquqi to'g'risidagi konvensiyasi (UNCLOS). History as a legal basis is now not accepted.
1995The Philippine government revealed that a PRC military structure was being built at the Yaramaslik rifi. Filippin prezidenti Fidel Ramos ordered increased patrols of the Philippine-controlled areas; the incident lead to numerous arrests of Chinese fishermen and naval clashes with REJA kemalar.
1999A Philippine World-War-II-vintage vessel (LT 57 Sierra Madre) ran aground on the Ikkinchi Tomas Shoal. Despite initial PRC demands for its removal, and subsequent PRC offers for its free removal, the vessel remains aground on the reef.[77][78]
2008Taiwan's president became the first head of state from a claimant country to visit the Spratly islands. His visit sparked criticism from other claimants.
2009The Office of the Philippine President enacted the "Philippine Baselines Law of 2009" (RA 9522). The law classifies the Kalayaan Island Group and the Skarboro Shoal as a "regime of islands under the Republic of the Philippines". This means that the Philippines continues to lay claim over the disputed islands.[79]

In May, two submissions were made to the UN's Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS): a joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam claims jurisdiction over their respective continental shelves out to 200 nautical miles; a submission by Vietnam claims jurisdiction over an extended shelf area. The People's Republic of China and the Philippines both protested the moves, stating that they violated agreements made with regard to the islands.[80][81]

2011On 18 May 2011 China Mobile announced that its mobile-phone coverage had expanded to include the Spratly Islands, under the rationale that it can allow soldiers stationed on the islands, fishermen and merchant vessels within the area to use mobile services, and can also provide assistance during storms and sea rescues. The deployment of China Mobile's support over the islands took roughly one year to fulfil.[82]

In May, PRC patrol boats attacked and cut the cables of Vietnamese oil-exploration ships near the Spratly Islands. The incidents sparked several anti-China protests in Vietnam.

In June, the PLA navy conducted three days of exercises, including live fire drills, in the disputed waters. This was seen as a warning to Vietnam, which had also conducted live fire drills near the Spratly Islands. PRC patrol boats fired repeated rounds at a target on an apparently uninhabited island, as twin fighter-jets streaked in tandem overhead. 14 vessels participated in the manoeuvres, staging antisubmarine and beach-landing drills aimed at "defending atolls and protecting sea lanes".[83]

2012On 11 July 2012 a Chinese 053 raqamini kiriting frigate, the Dongguan, ran aground on PRC-controlled Yaramaslik rifi, sparking embarrassment for the Chinese government and causing an awkward diplomatic situation. Keyinchalik kema yana bazaga tortib olingan.[84]
2014On 6 May 2014 Philippines police arrested 11 Chinese turtle poachers on board the Qiongqionghai near Half Moon Shoal.[85]
2015On 20 May 2015 the Chinese navy sternly warned a United States P8-A Poseidon, on a surveillance flight over the Fiery Cross Reef, to leave the "Chinese military alert zone".[86] Pentagon released a video recording of the challenge to CNN[87] amid "growing momentum within the Pentagon and White House for taking concrete steps" in the region.[88]
2016On 16 February 2016, the imagery from Image Sat International (ISI) showed that the Chinese military had deployed an advanced surface-to-air missile system on one of the contested islands in the South China Sea. It appeared to show the HQ-9 air defense system, which closely resembles Russia's S-300 missile system. The HQ-9 has a range of 125 miles, which would pose a threat to any airplanes, civilians or military, flying close by.[89]
2017In January 2017, Vietnam signed a multibillion-dollar gas deal with the US's Exxonmobil for exploration and to extract gas by 2023 from an area close to the disputed Paracel Islands[90]

Spratli orollari tarixi

In the 19th century, Europeans found that Chinese fishermen from Hainan annually sojourned on the Spratly islands for part of the year, while in 1877 it was the British who launched the first modern legal claims to the Spratlys.[47][48]

When the Spratlys and Paracels were being surveyed by Germany in 1883, China issued protests against them.[41] China sent naval forces on inspection tours in 1902 and 1907 and placed flags and markers on the islands. The Qing dynasty's successor state, the Republic of China, claimed the Spratly and Paracel islands under the jurisdiction of Hainan.[49]

The Spratlys and the Paracels were conquered by Japan in 1939. Japan administered the Spratlys via Taiwan's jurisdiction and the Paracels via Hainan's jurisdiction.[47]

In 1946, the Americans reminded the Philippines at its independence that the Spratlys was not Philippine territory, both to not anger Chiang Qay-shek in China and because the Spratlys were not part of the Philippines per the 1898 treaty Spain signed with America.[47]

The Paracels and Spratlys were handed over to Republic of China control from Japan after the 1945 surrender of Japan,[51] since the Allied powers assigned the Republic of China to receive Japanese surrenders in that area.[49]

The Republic of China garrisoned Itu Aba (Taiping) island in 1946 and posted Chinese flags and markers on it along with Woody island in the Paracels, France tried, but failed to make them leave Woody island.[47] The aim of the Republic of China was to block the French claims.[49][52]

In 1947, the Republic of China drew up the map showing the U shaped claim on the entire South China Sea, showing the Spratly and Paracels in Chinese territory.[49] In 1947, the ROC government renamed 159 islands in the area and published the Janubiy Xitoy dengiz orollari xaritasi. The ROC was the first government to establish a physical presence in the Spratly Islands. It has occupied Taypin oroli, the largest island in the Spratlys, constantly since 1956.[91]

The Republic of China (ROC), which ruled materik Xitoy before 1949, has been confined to Taiwan since 1949. The Xalq ozodlik armiyasi va Xitoy Respublikasi qurolli kuchlari are both stationed in several islands, including the largest, Taypin oroli – occupied by ROC.

After pulling out its garrison in 1950 when the Republic of China evacuated to Taiwan, when the Filipino Tomas Cloma uprooted an ROC flag on Itu Aba laid claim to the Spratlys and, the Republic of China (now Taiwan) again regarrisoned Itu Aba on 1956.[92]

Taiwan's garrison from 1946–1950 and 1956-now on Itu Aba represents an "effective occupation" of the Spratlys.[53][54] China established a coastal defence system against Japanese pirates or smugglers.[93]

North Vietnam recognised China's claims on the Paracels and Spratlys during the Vietnam War as it was being supported by China. Only after winning the war and conquering South Vietnam did North Vietnam retract its recognition and admitted it recognised them as part of China to receive aid from China in fighting the Americans.[94]

The Philippines claimed the Spratlys in 1971 under President Marcos, after Taiwanese troops attacked and shot at a Philippine fishing boat on Itu Aba.[53]

Prezident davrida Li Teng Xu, Taiwan stated that "legally, historically, geographically, or in reality", all of the South China Sea and Spratly islands were Taiwan's territory and under Taiwanese sovereignty, and denounced actions undertaken there by Malaysia and the Philippines, in a statement on 13 July 1999 released by the foreign ministry of Taiwan.[95] Taiwan and China's claims "mirror" each other; during international talks involving the Spratly islands, China and Taiwan have cooperated with each other since both have the same claims.[53][96]

Taiwan and China are largely strategically aligned on the Spratly islands issue, since they both claim exactly the same area, so Taiwan's control of Itu Aba (Taiping) island is viewed as an extension of China's claim.[41] Taiwan and China both claim the entire island chain, while all the other claimants only claim portions of them. China has proposed co-operation with Taiwan against all the other countries claiming the islands. Taiwanese lawmakers have demanded that Taiwan fortify Itu Aba (Taiping) island with weapons to defend against the Vietnamese, and both China and Taiwanese NGOs have pressured Taiwan to expand Taiwan's military capabilities on the island, which played a role in Taiwan expanding the island's runway in 2012.[97] China has urged Taiwan to co-operate and offered Taiwan a share in oil and gas resources while shutting out all the other rival claimants. Taiwanese lawmakers have complained about repeated Vietnamese aggression and trespassing on Taiwan's Itu Aba (Taiping), and Taiwan has started viewing Vietnam as an enemy over the Spratly Islands, not China.[98] Taiwan's state run oil company CPC Corp's board director Chiu Yi has called Vietnam as the "greatest threat" to Taiwan.[97] Taiwan's airstrip on Taiping has irritated Vietnam.[99] China views Taiwan's expansion of its military and airstrip on Taiping as benefiting China's position against the other rival claimants from southeast Asian countries.[54]

Malaysia has militarily occupied three islands that it considers to be within its continental shelf. Rifni yutib oling (Layang Layang / Terumbu Layang / Pulau Layang Layang) was under control on 1983 and has been turned into an island through a melioratsiya which now also hosts a dive resort.[37] The Malaysian military also occupies Ardasier rifi (Terumbu Ubi) va Mariveles rifi (Terumbu Mantanani).[33]

Since 1992, Malaysia and Vietnam have agreed to jointly develop areas around these disputed islands.[100] Malaysia has said that it is monitoring all of the actions made by countries involved in the dispute.[101]

Taiwan performed live fire military exercises on Taiping island in September 2012; reports said that Vietnam was explicitly named by the Taiwanese military as the "imaginary enemy" in the drill. Vietnam protested against the exercises as violation of its territory and "voiced anger", demanding that Taiwan stop the drill. Among the inspectors of the live fire drill were Taiwanese national legislators, adding to the tensions.[102]

In 2010, it was reported that the former Malaysian Prime Minister Maxathir Mohamad believed Malaysia could profit from China's economic growth through co-operation with China,[103] and said that China "was not a threat to anyone and was not worried about aggression from China", as well accusing the United States of provoking China and trying to turn China's neighbours against China.[104] Malaysian authorities displayed no concern over China conducting a military exercise at James Shoal in March 2013,[105][106] However, until present Malaysia still maintained a balance relations with the countries involved in this dispute.[107] But since China has start enroaching its territorial waters,[108] Malayziya Xitoyni qoralashda faollashdi.[109][110]

In January 2013, the Philippines formally initiated arbitration proceedings against China's claim on the territories within the "to'qqiz chiziqli chiziq" that includes Spratly Islands, which it said is "unlawful" under the Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Dengiz huquqi to'g'risidagi konvensiyasi (UNCLOS).[111][112] VII ilova asosida hakamlik sudi tashkil etilgan UNCLOS va 2013 yil iyul oyida Doimiy Arbitraj sudi (PCA) would function as registry and provide administrative duties in the proceedings.[113]

On 12 July 2016, the arbitrators of the tribunal of PCA agreed unanimously with the Philippines. Ular mukofotda Xitoy tarixiy ravishda suvlar yoki manbalar ustidan eksklyuziv nazoratni amalga oshirganligi to'g'risida hech qanday dalil yo'q degan xulosaga kelishdi, shuning uchun to'qqizta chiziq bo'yicha "Xitoyning tarixiy huquqlarini talab qilishi uchun hech qanday qonuniy asos yo'q".[114] Accordingly, the PCA tribunal decision is ruled as final and non-appealable by either countries.[115][116] The tribunal also criticized China's land reclamation projects and its construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, saying that it had caused "severe harm to the coral reef environment".[117] It also characterized Taypin oroli and other features of the Spratly Islands as "rocks" under UNCLOS, and therefore are not entitled to a 200 nautical mile eksklyuziv iqtisodiy zona.[118] China however rejected the ruling, calling it "ill-founded".[119] Taiwan, which currently administers Taiping Island, the largest of the Spratly Islands, also rejected the ruling.[120]

Shuningdek qarang

Adabiyotlar

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